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Anonymous Single Sign-on Schemes Transformed
from Group Signatures
Jingquan Wang, Guilin Wang, and Willy Susilo
Center for Computer and Information Security Research
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong, Australia

Abstract—Single Sign-on (SSO) allows a user to obtain a single
credential from a Trusted Third Party (TTP) once and then
authenticates himself/herself to different service providers by
using the same credential. Though different SSO schemes have
been obtained from various primitives, user anonymity has not
yet been studied formally. Motivated by the fact that anonymity
is a very essential security requirement in certain scenarios, in
this paper we first formalize a security model of anonymous
single-sign on (ASSO). Subsequently, we present a generic ASSO
scheme which is transformed from group signatures. Formal
proofs are provided to show that the proposed ASSO is secure
under the assumption that the underlying group signature is
secure according to Bellare et al.’s model introduced at CT-RSA
2005. Compared to existing SSO schemes, our transformation
not only implements the user’s anonymity, but also reduces the
trust level in TTP.
Keywords: Single Sign-On, Anonymity, Authentication, Group
Signatures

I. I NTRODUCTION
With the extensive usage of the Internet, users usually are
required to access multiple services on a daily basis, and therefore they may have to maintain a lot of username/password
pairs. Nevertheless, with the growth in the number of service
providers this approach becomes either inefficient if each login
should be unique for each service, or insecure if the same login
is used for multiple services. In reality, as many as one third
of users [1], [17] tend to use the same or similar passwords
to access their services. Moreover, it is also a considerable
burden for service providers if they have to manage credentials
for dealing with credential issuing, updating, revocation, etc.
Fortunately, in a single sign-on (SSO) model, during a given
period (eg. one day) a user may perform just one single sign-on
to a trusted third party (TTP), which is trusted by the applications he/she needs to access. Later on, each time the user
wants to access an application, he/she will be automatically
authenticated by the interaction between his client and the
TTP, without requiring direct involvement from the user.
Kerberos is one of the earliest single sign-on solutions,
proposed by Steiner et al. [16] in 1988, though it is called
a network authentication system. The system consists of an
Authentication Server, a Ticket Granting Server and a set of
service providers. To acquire the Ticket Granting Ticket from
a Ticket Granting Server, a user should first go through the
authentication with Authentication Server. Actually, Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server act together as a TTP

(or called trusted identity provider in [14]) in an SSO scheme.
However, not only the process of authentication but also the infrastructure management is very complex. Moreover, unproven
symmetric mechanisms are used in Kerberos to authenticate
users, which may lead to potential security weaknesses.
Released in 2005, OpenID [2] is one of single sign-on
solutions proposed in industry, which is an open and decentralized standard for authenticating users. In OpenID, the user
can freely select the identity providers from any web based
application where he has registered with. Before signing on to
a given web based application that supports OpenID, the user
first signs on to the identity provider and OpenID exchanges
the necessary authentication data between the identity provider
and the application. However, the mechanism of exchanging
the necessary authentication data between the identity provider
and the application is complex and can be attacked through
network based techniques[10].
In 2010, Han et al. [14] proposed a novel dynamic SSO
model together with a generic scheme. This scheme employs
a digital signature to guarantee both the unforgeability and
the public verification of credential. In addition, a broadcast
encryption is used to protect the privacy of credential, which
means that except the authorised service providers nobody can
check the validity of a credential. After the credential verification the user should run zero-knowledge proofs to prove that
he/she is legal to use the valid credential, for resisting against
impersonation attacks. However, the broadcast encryption is
a complex and inefficient process. In 2012, Yu et al. [22]
proposed a single sign-on model with key exchange, and the
advantage is that each user does not need hold a public/private
key pair, while this is required in Han et al.’s model. However,
the trust level of TTP is higher than that in Han et al.’s
model, because in Yu et al.’s model the TTP is assumed to
not impersonate any user, which is rather unrealistic.
Anonymity in electronic communication is very important
for users in many scenarios, as they may not prefer to
provide personal information to service providers though their
membership for belonging to a group or association should
be verified in the first place. For example, if a web site or
online forum does not support user anonymity, it may be hard
to attract a good number of comments and discussions. The
main reason is that users may be afraid of talking freely to
prevent unexpected trouble, as some sensitive topics may be
involved. In addition, anonymity usually can prompt users to

express themselves while they may not like to behave the same
in real life.
Unfortunately, most of existing SSO systems have shortcomings. For example, in some SSO systems like [11], when
the user wants to access a service by using a credential,
the service provider (SP) has to directly communicate with
the TTP because SP cannot verify the validity of credential.
Another drawback is that some systems [15], [19], [20] are
fragile to resist single point of failure, as the TTP is required
to be always online. Moreover, SSO scheme proposed in [16]
does not prevent illegal usage of a personal credential, since an
illegal user can access services if he obtains a legal user’s valid
credential. Moreover, SSO systems given in [14], [22] require
high trust level in the TTP and anonymity is not implemented.
To the best of our knowledge, anonymity in SSO has only been
informally introduced in the scenario of Global System for
Mobile communication by Elmufti et al [12]. In this system,
to access each SP a user will use a different one-time ID as
a temporary identity to authenticate himself to a TTP (the
GSM network operator), and TTP then forward users request
to the SP. So, the user is anonymous for the SP as the SP
only knows the user’s temporary ID, not real identity. In this
system, single point of failure may be an issue and users are
NOT anonymous to the TTP.
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and and Van Heyst
[9], implement the anonymity of signers, in contrast to the
classical digital signature. With in-depth study, more security
requirements were proposed in [3], [7]. After that, Bellare et
al. [4], [5] proposed the formal definitions of group signatures.

computing [6].

Our Contributions. In this work, we aim to formalize the
notion of anonymous single sign-on (ASSO). This notion is
motivated by the essential need of anonymity in single signon systems. For example, in the scenarios of subscription of
online magazines, news, and digital library or digital resource
control in organisations. At the same time, we observe that
anonymity has not been formally studied in SSO and that
almost all SSO schemes do not support anonymity. Therefore,
we are motivated to formally study anonymous single sign-on
(ASSO) in this paper by proposing the first formal model and
presenting a generic ASSO construction transformed from any
group signature scheme, which satisfies the security notions
proposed in [5]. Formal proofs are also provided to show
that this ASSO is secure according to the proposed formal
definitions. Though the transformation from group signature
to ASSO is straightforward, the novelty of our work is threefold: (a) Our formal model is carefully formalised to capture
security requirements in ASSO, in which group signature may
be not necessary the only implementation tool; (b) Based
on our formal security analysis, we can conclude that group
signature (under proper model) is a strong enough building
block to implement ASSO; and (c) ASSO forms one more
potential application of group signatures, which have been
extensively investigated in literature but lack real applications,
except a variant technique called direct anonymous attestation
(DAA) has been employed as the core mechanism in trusted

Definition 1. An anonymous single sign-on (ASSO) scheme
involves a trusted third party TTP, a group of service providers
SPs and a group of users U. It consists of five algorithms
and one protocol: system setup algorithm Setup(·), user
proof generation algorithm U P Gen(·), user proof verification
algorithm U P V er(·), user tracing algorithm T race(·), user
tracing verification algorithm N otary(·) and user enrollment
protocol Enrol.
- Setup: By taking a security parameter 1k as an input, it
outputs a tuple (tpk, tik, tok), where tpk is TTP’s public
key, tik is TTP’s private issuing key, and tok is TTP’s
private opening key.
- Enrol: A user can enrol in the system by running
Enrol protocol with TTP. Firstly, a user Ui generates
his personal public/private key pair (upki , uski ). Then Ui
sends a request with his/her upki to TTP. If TTP accepts
according to some registration policy (such as charging
subscription fee), it uses the private issuing key tik to
generate a registration certificate for Ui , denoted as regi .
Then, TTP will send regi to user Ui , and store a copy of
this certificate in its registration table reg as well. Finally,
Ui can get his credential Crei = (regi , ski ), where ski
is Ui ’s signing key, which is generated from regi and
uski .
- U P Gen: By taking the inputs of TTP’s public key tpk,
Ui ’s credential Crei and a message m, it outputs a

Paper Organization. In Section 2, we formalize the security
model of anonymous single sign-on (ASSO) scheme. Then, a
very brief review of Bellare et al.’s formal definition for group
signature is given Section 3, while more details are deferred
to Appendix A. In Section 4, a generic construction of ASSO
from group signature is described. Compared to previous SSO
solutions given in [14], [22], there are two main advantages in
our generic ASSO: users are anonymous, and the trust level
of TTP is reduced as only the user knows his/her credential
so that nobody can impersonate him. In Section 5, we provide
formal proofs to show the security of our scheme. Finally, we
give a short conclusion and discuss our future work in Section
6.
II. F ORMAL M ODEL OF A NONYMOUS S INGLE S IGN -O N
In this section, we provide a security model to formally define anonymous single sign-on (ASSO). This model specifies
the functions of ASSO and the security requirements that an
ASSO should satisfy.
A. Syntax of Anonymous Single Sign-on
In an ASSO scheme, a user (U) obtains a credential from a
trusted third party (TTP) once and then authenticates himself
to different service providers (SPs) by generating a user proof
via using the same credential. SPs can confirm the validity of
each user but should not be able to trace the user’s identity.
Now we formalize the components of ASSO as follows.

user proof upi showing user Ui ’s knowledge of credential
Crei .
- U P V er: By taking the inputs of TTP’s public key tpk
and a message/user proof pair (m, upi ), it outputs 1 or
0 for accepting or rejecting upi as a valid user proof.
- T race: By taking the inputs of registration table reg,
TTP’s private opening key tok and a valid message/user
proof pair (m, upi ), it outputs an integer i (i ≥ 0) and a
proof-string τ . If i ≥ 1, i denotes an identity; otherwise
it means no group member produced this upi . Output τ
is the associated evidence, which will be used in N otary
algorithm.
- N otary: By taking inputs of the TTP’s public key tpk,
an integer i ≥ 1, the public key upki of Ui , a valid
message/user proof pair (m, upi ), and a proof-string τ ,
it checks whether τ is a valid proof showing that Ui has
generated upi for message m.
Remark 1. Each user Ui ’s personal private key uski is only
used to generate his credential when he enrols into system,
while the corresponding public key upki can be published
through a PKI online or some approach off-line.
Remark 2. Compared to Han et al.’s formal model [14] and
Yu et al.’s formal model [22], the most obvious advantage
in our model is to achieve anonymity. In addition, the trust
level of TTP in our model is lowest, because TTP can
neither generate the credential without the user’s involvement
nor impersonate the user. Moreover, there is no broadcast
encryption and key exchange in our model, thus our model
is simpler.
Remark 3. Note that the Trace algorithm is used to identify
the identity of a malicious user to prevent misusing a system,
though the enforcement of such a procedure should follow
a carefully specified policy and may be monitored by an
additional authority, which is outside of our ASSO system.
So, in this case our ASSO scheme is actually conditionally
anonymous as it is traceable. In some scenarios, however,
strong anonymity may be required such that a user’s identity is
unconditionally untraceable. To define such SSO schemes with
strong anonymity, one simple way is to ‘turn off’ the function
of traceability by generating an unknown private opening key
tok. Namely, nobody (including the TTP) knows the value of
tok. For a Diffie-Hellman key based system, this can be simply
done by selecting a random element y from a group G with a
generator g so that the corresponding private key x satisfying
y = g x is unknown to anybody. For an RSA based system, this
can also be done but the mechanism will be more complex.
B. Security Definitions of Anonymous Single Sign-On
In this section, we will formally define the security notions
of ASSO, including correctness, anonymity, traceability and
non-frameability. Correctness is the basic requirement which
ensures that a scheme works if all parties honestly follow
the algorithms and protocols as specified. Anonymity protects
users’ privacy by requiring that SPs can only confirm the

validity of each user but are not able to know the user’s
identity. The TTP and SPs concern traceability because it
can ensure that a user can neither generate a valid user proof
without a credential nor get a valid credential without TTP’s
endorsement. The users also concern non-frameability as it
means that any adversary, including malicious TTP and/or SPs,
cannot impersonate a user.
1) Correctness: Correctness of ASSO requires that (a) a
user proof generated by an honest user should be valid; (b)
the T race algorithm, given a valid pair of message and user
proof, should correctly identify the user who generated this
proof; and (c) the proof τ returned by the T race algorithm
should be accepted by the N otary algorithm.
Definition 2. Formally, an anonymous single sign-on system is
correct if for any k ∈ N, any (tpk, tik, tok) ← Setup(1k ), a
valid credential Crei for each identity i, and any m ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,
there is no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A
which can break any of three requirements listed below:
• U P V er(tpk, m, U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m)) = 1
• T race(reg, tok, m, U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m)) = (i, τ )
• N otary(tpk, i, upki , m, upi , τ ) = true, where (i, τ ) is
output by T race algorithm w.r.t. (m, upi ).
2) Anonymity: Anonymity means that for any adversary A,
even if he knows the issuing key tik of TTP and the private
key uski and credential Crei of every user, he should be still
unable to deduce who has generated a given user proof.
Definition 3. Formally, an anonymous single sign-on scheme
is said to be anonymous, if no PPT adversary A has a
non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in Game
1 defined below.
Game 1. Anonymity
- Setup. C runs the algorithm Setup(1k ) to generate the
tuple (tpk, tik, tok) and then sends (k, tpk) to adversary
A. C now initialises a number of users denoted as a list
LU , together with the corresponding registration table
reg.
- Running Queries. C will run three oracles for adversary
A in this phase: Corrupt TTP Oracle I, Corrupt User
Oracle and Tracing Oracle.
A could query the corrupt TTP oracle I to obtain the
private issuing key tik and the registration table reg.
This oracle simulates the compromise of issuing key and
registration table.
A could query the corrupt user oracle by sending an
index i, where Ui ∈ LU , to obtain the private key uski
and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui from C. A list
LCU is assumed initially empty and updated by LCU ←
LCU ∪ {Ui }. This oracle simulates A’s ability to collude
or compromise as many as users.
A could query the tracing oracle by sending a valid
message-user proof pair (mi , upi ) to obtain corresponding identity i and a proof τ , which is the output returned
by challenger C after execution of T race algorithm w.r.t.
(reg, tok, mi , upi ). If i > 0, it means that Ui is traced

as the user who generated (mi , upi ); while i = 0 means
that there is no group member being traced as the issuer
of (mi , upi ) w.r.t. the current reg. An opened messageuser proof list LO is assumed initially empty and updated
by LO ← LO ∪ {(mi , upi )}.
- Challenge: A selects a message m∗ and two indices
i0 , i1 of its choice, where both Ui0 , Ui1 ∈ LU , and
sends them to C. C responds back with a user proof
upib , where b ∈ {0, 1} is a random bit and upib =
U P Gen(tpk, Creib , m∗ ).
- Output: A outputs a bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} for guessing b.
During this phase, A can access all the above three
oracles with the restrictions that (m∗ , upib ) has not been
asked via opening oracle. If b∗ = b, A wins the game.
Formally, the advantage of adversary A in this game is
defined as
∗
O
∗
∗
Advanon
ASSO,A (k) = | Pr[b ← A (k, m , upib )b = b|

∧(m∗ , upib ) ∈
/ LO ] − 1/2|.
Remark 4. In this game, A is allowed to obtain the private
issuing key tik, so he can enrol new users by himself and
change the content of registration table reg, which is the copy
held by A itself. Note that according to above definition, A
can corrupt the credential of any user, including the target
users Ui0 and Ui1 . Due to this reason, it is not necessary to
offer A the user proof generating oracle.
3) Traceability: Traceability means that for any PPT adversary A, who may know the opening key tok of TTP and
corrupt the private key/credential (uski , Crei ) of as many
users as he likes, he should still be unable to generate a
message/user proof pair (m, up) that cannot be traced to a user
or that can be traced to a user Ui but N otary(tpk, i, m, upi , τ )
= false.
Definition 4. Formally, an ASSO scheme is traceable, if no
PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the
challenge C in the game defined below.
Game 2. Traceability
- Setup. C runs the algorithm Setup(1k ) to generate the
tuple (tpk, tik, tok) and initialises a number of users,
which is denoted as a list LU , together with registration
table reg. Then, k, tpk, LU and reg are sent to adversary
A.
- Running Queries. C will run three oracles in this phase:
Corrupt TTP Oracle II, Enrol Oracle and Corrupt User
Oracle.
A could query the corrupt TTP oracle II to obtain
the private opening key tok. This oracle simulates the
compromise of opening key.
A could query the enrol oracle to enrol a new user
Ui with C by running Enrol protocol. If A performs
honestly, he knows the private key uski and is able to
obtain credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui , where regi is

returned from the challenger C. Correspondingly C will
update the registration table by reg ← reg ∪ {regi }. This
oracle simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise as
many as new users.
A could query the corrupt user oracle by sending an
index i, where Ui ∈ LU , to obtain the private key uski
and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui from C.
A corrupted user list LCU is assumed initially empty,
and then updated by LCU ← LCU ∪ {Ui }. This oracle
simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise as many
as users initialised by challenger C.
- Output. Finally, A outputs a message m∗ and a user
proof up∗ . If up∗ turns up to be a valid user proof for m∗ ,
C will try to trace it to a user. If it traces to nonmember
or if it traces to a user Uj but N otary(tpk, j, m∗ , up∗ , τ )
= false, then A wins the game. Formally, A’s advantage
in this game is defined by
∗
∗
O
Advtrac
ASSO,A (k) = Pr[(m , up ) ← A (k)|
U P V er(tpk, m∗ , up∗ ) = 1∧
(T race(reg, tok, m∗ , up∗ ) = (0, τ )∨
(T race(tok, m∗ , up∗ ) = (j, τ )∧
N otary(tpk, j, m∗ , up∗ , τ ) = f alse))].
Remark 5. In this game, as A is allowed to obtain the private
opening key tok he can open any message-user proof pair
(m, up) by himself without needing opening oracle. Moreover,
note that both unforgeability of credential [14], [22] and
soundness of SSO [22] are implied by traceability defined
above. On the one hand, according to Definition 4 without
the knowledge of tik A is not able to forge a valid credential
for a new user and then employ this credential to generate
user proofs (unforgeability). On the other hand, in Definition
4 it is infeasible for A to generate a valid user proof without
holding a valid credential (soundness).
4) Non-frameability: Non-frameability means that for any
PPT adversary A, even he can corrupt TTP and all users except
the target uncorrupted user U ∗ , he should be still unable to
generate a valid message/user proof pair (m∗ , up∗ ), which
traces to user U ∗ . In other words, non-frameability implies
that even a malicious TTP colluding with dishonest users is
still unable to frame a honest user by forging a valid user
proof.
Definition 5. An anonymous single sign-on system satisfies
non-frameability, if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible
advantage against the challenger in in the game defined below.
Game 3. Non-frameability
- Setup: C runs algorithm Setup(1k ) to generate a tuple
(tpk, tik, tok), and initialises a number of users, denoted
as the list LU , together with the corresponding registration table reg. Then, C sends (k, tpk, LU ) to adversary
A.
- Running Queries: C will run three oracles in this phase:
Corrupt TTP Oracle, Corrupt User Oracle, and Generate
User Proof Oracle.
A could query the corrupt TTP oracle to obtain the

issuing key tik, the opening key tok and the registration
table reg. This oracle simulates A’s ability to compromise
or collude TTP.
A could query the corrupt user oracle by sending an
index i, where Ui ∈ LU , to obtain the private key uski
and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui from C.
A corrupted user list LCU is assumed initially empty,
and then updated by LCU ← LCU ∪ {Ui }. This oracle
simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise as many
as users initialised by challenger C.
A could query the generate user proof oracle by sending
a message-user pair (mi , Ui ) to obtain a valid user
proof upi from challenger C, where Ui ∈ LU and
upi = U P Gen(tpk, Crei , mi ). A generated user proof
list, denoted as LU P , which is initialised as empty, will
be updated by LU P ← LU P ∪ {(mi , Ui , upi )}.
- Output: Finally, A outputs a message m∗ and a user
proof up∗ . If U P V er(tpk, m∗ , up∗ ) = 1, C will try to
trace this user proof. A wins the game, if a user Uj ∈
LU is traced, but Uj has never been corrupted by A
in corrupt user oracle and (m∗ , Uj , ∗) has never been
returned in the generate user proof oracle. A’s advantage
in this game is defined by
∗
∗
O
Advnonf
ASSO,A (k) = Pr[(m , up ) ← A (k, LU )|
∗
U P V er(tpk, m , up∗ ) = 1 ∧ Uj ∈
LU \LCU ∧ (m∗ , Uj , ∗) ∈
/ LU P ,
where T race(tpk, tok, m∗ , up∗ ) = (j, τ )].
Remark 6. The above definition of non-frameability also
covers credential privacy [21], [14], [22], which is defined
to guarantee that colluded dishonest service providers should
not be able to fully recover a user’s credential and then
impersonate the user to log in to other service providers.
III. DYNAMIC G ROUP S IGNATURES
In the formal model proposed by Bellare et al. [5], a
dynamic group signature scheme GS comprises a trusted
party for generating keys, two authorities called the issuer and
opener, and a body of users, each with a unique identity i ∈ N.
A GS is specified as a tuple (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, GSig,
GVf, Open, Judge) of polynomial-time algorithms, whose
intended usage and functionality are described in [5].
A correct and secure GS should satisfy four properties, namely, correctness, anonymity, traceability, and nonframeability, which are defined by experiments in which an
adversary has access to certain oracles. Moreover, the oracles
in each of these experiments are assumed to maintain and
manipulate the global variables: a set HU of honest users; a set
CU of corrupted users; a set GSet of message-signature pairs;
a table upk such that upk[i] contains the public key of i ∈ N; a
table reg such that reg[i] contains the registration information
of group member i. The sets HU, CU, GSet, as well as
all entries of the tables upk and reg, are assumed initially
empty, denoted as ε. Formal definitions of these properties
are specified in [5].

IV. G ENERIC C ONSTRUCTION OF ASSO FROM G ROUP
S INGATURES
In this section, we give a straightforward construction of
ASSO from dynamic group signatures. It means that any group
signature GS satisfying the definition given in Section 3 can
be used to derive an ASSO scheme by simply using group
signature to issue a user proof.
- Setup(1k ): It runs group signature GS’s key generation
algorithm GKg(1k ) to obtain the tuple (gpk, ik, ok), and
then sets (tpk, tik, tok) = (gpk, ik, ok).
- Enrol: A user can enrol in the system by running Enrol
protocol with TTP. Firstly, user Ui runs GS’s algorithm
UKg(1k ) to generate a key pair (upk[i], usk[i]), and
sets (upki , uski ) = (upk[i], usk[i]). Then, Ui sends a
request to TTP. If TTP accepts, it uses the issuing key
tik to run GS’s algorithm Iss to generate an certificate
for Ui , denoted as regi , which will be stored in the
registration table reg and sent to Ui as well. If Ui accepts,
he runs GS’s algorithm Join to generate his signing
key gsk[i]. Finally, the credential of Ui is defined as
Crei = (regi , ski ) where ski = gsk[i].
- U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m): It runs GS’s algorithm
GSig(ski , m) to generate a signature σ, and outputs the
user proof upi = σ.
- U P V er(tpk, m, upi ): It runs GS’s algorithm
GVf(tpk, m, upi ) to verify if upi is a valid group
signature on m, and correspondingly outputs 1 or 0
for accepting or rejecting upi as a valid user proof for
message m.
- T race(reg, tok, m, upi ): It runs GS’s algorithm
Open(tok, reg, m, upi ) to output an integer i and a
proof-string τ . If i ≥ 1, i denotes Ui ; otherwise it means
no group member produced this upi . Output τ is the
associated evidence, which will be used in N otary
algorithm.
- N otary(tpk, i, upki , m, upi , τ ): It runs GS’s algorithm
Judge(tpk, i, upki , m, upi , τ ) to check whether τ is a
proof that Ui generated upi .
Instantiation. Our ASSO construction is a generic transformation from Bellare et al.’s dynamic group signature model [5].
This implies that any secure group signature follow Bellare et
al.’s model, like [13], [18], can be used to instantiate our ASSO
scheme. In particular, Nguyen and Safavi-Naini [18] proposed
a group signature scheme without requiring trapdoor, in which
both signature and public key are constant-size regardless of
the group size. This scheme is efficient and practical because
the lengths of signature, group manager’s public key, private
issuing key, private opening key and group member’s signing
key are 574 bytes, 363 bytes, 22 bytes, 44 bytes, and 192
bytes, respectively. Thus our transformation can be efficiently
implemented in concrete instantiation. Due to space limit,
detailed analysis has to be omitted here.

V. S ECURITY P ROOFS
It is easy to see that correctness of a dynamic group
signature (Section 3.2.1) implies the correctness of our generic
ASSO described above according to Definition 2. Now, we
prove that other properties can be guaranteed as well.
Theorem 1. The ASSO scheme proposed above is anonymous
if the dynamic group signature scheme used above is anonymous.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which can
break the anonymity of our generic construction of ASSO. We
will show that there exists an adversary B which can break the
anonymity of the dynamic group signature scheme GS, which
is used to construct ASSO.
• Init. B receives the security parameter k ∈ N, a public
key gpk and a private key ik. B sets gpk as the public
key tpk of TTP and ik as the private issuing key tik of
TTP. As B knows ik, it initialises a number of users in
the list LU and generates the corresponding registration
table reg by running Join and Iss algorithms. Then, B
runs A by simulating oracles for A as follows.
• Corrupt TTP Oracle I: If A queries the partially corrupt
TTP oracle I, A returns back B the private issuer key tik
and the registration table reg.
• Corrupt User Oracle: If A queries the corrupt user oracle
by sending an index i, where Ui ∈ LU , B retrieves regi
from reg, redirects this query to GS’s oracle U SK(i) to
get uski , and calculates ski from regi and uski . Then,
B will respond A the private key uski and the credential
Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui . In addition, a corrupted user
list LCU , assumed initially empty, will be updated by
LCU ← LCU ∪ {Ui }.
• Opening Oracle: If A queries the opening oracle by sending a message mi and a user proof upi . B redirects this
query to GS’s oracle Open(·, ·) to get a pair (i, τ ). Then,
(i, τ ) will be forwarded to A. List LO , assumed initially
empty, will be updated by LO ← LO ∪ {(mi , upi )}.
Once A selects a message m∗ and two indices i0 and i1 , B
will forward (m∗ , i0 , i1 ) to his challenger, who will respond
back with a signature σb to B. Then, B returns the user proof
upb = σb to A.
Finally, A will output a guess b∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If A can break
the anonymity of our generic construction for ASSO, b∗ = b
will be true with non-negligible probability and (m∗ , upb ) ∈
/
LO . This means that B can just forward b∗ to his challenger to
break the anonymity of the dynamic group signature scheme
with the same non-negligible probability. It is also easy to see
that B’s running time is polynomial if A’s is.
Therefore, the ASSO scheme proposed above is anonymous
if the dynamic group signature scheme used above is anonymous.

Theorem 2. The ASSO scheme proposed above is traceable if
the dynamic group signature scheme used above is traceable.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which can

break the traceability of our generic construction for ASSO.
We will show that there exists an adversary B which can break
the traceability of above dynamic group signature scheme GS.
C is the challenger of GS.
• Init. B receives the public parameter k ∈ N, a public key
gpk and a private opening key ok from the challenger
C. B simulates an ASSO system by setting the tuple
(gpk, ik, ok) as the TTP’s key tuple (tpk, tik, tok),
where the issuing key ik of GS is not known to B but
it can be implicitly set as the private issuing key of
ASSO. Then, B initialises a number of users in the list
LU by enquiring oracle AddU (·), which is provided by
challenger C of GS. After that, B can get the registration
table reg by enquiring RReg(·) oracle. Now, B sends
(k, tpk, LU , reg) to A, and then runs sub-routine A as
follows.
• Corrupt TTP Oracle II: If A queries the corrupt TTP
oracle II, B simply returns the private opening key tok
to A.
• Enrol Oracle: If A queries the enrol oracle with B by
running Enrol protocol to enrol a new user Ui with user
public key upki . If A behaves honestly on behalf of Ui , B
can obtain regi by enquiring oracle SndT oI(·, ·), which
is provided by challenger C of GS. Then, B will update
reg by reg ← reg∪{regi } and forwards regi to A so that
A can obtain both uski which is selected by A on behalf
of Ui and Ui ’s credential Crei = (regi , ski ), where ski
is calculated from uski and regi .
• Corrupt User Oracle: If A queries the corrupt user
oracle by sending an index i, where Ui ∈ LU . To get
(uski , regi , crei ) B redirects this query to U SK(·) oracle
and RReg(·) oracle which are provided by C. Then, B
forwards A the private key uski and the credential Crei
= (regi , ski ) of Ui . The corrupted user list LCU , assumed
initially empty, is updated by LCU = LCU ∪ {Ui }.
Finally, A outputs a message-user proof pair (m∗ , up∗ ). As
A can break the traceability of our generic ASSO construction, with a non-negligible probability (m∗ , up∗ ) should be
valid and it will trace to nonmember or to a user U ∗ but
N otary(tpk, ∗, m∗ , up∗ , τ ) = false. So, by setting σ ∗ = up∗
B can trivially forward a message-signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) as
its forgery to break the traceability of the dynamic group
signature scheme GS used to construct our ASSO. According
the definition given in Section 3.2.3, it is not difficult to
see that attacker B breaks the traceability of the underlying
group signature GS with the same non-negligible probability
in polynomial time.
Therefore, the ASSO scheme proposed above is traceable if
the dynamic group signature scheme used above is traceable.

Theorem 3. The ASSO scheme proposed above is nonframeable if the dynamic group signature scheme used above
is non-frameable.
Proof. Suppose that there exist a PPT adversary A which can
break the non-frameability of our generic ASSO construction.

We will show that there exists a PPT adversary B which can
break the non-frameability of the dynamic group signature
scheme GS used in our ASSO. Let C be the challenger of
GS.
• Init. B receives the public parameter k ∈ N, a public key
gpk, a private opening key ok and a private issuing key
ik from C. B simulates an ASSO system by setting the
tuple (gpk, ik, ok) as the TTP’s key tuple (tpk, tik, tok).
B initialises a number of users in the list LU by honestly
running Join and Iss algorithms. During this process, B
obtains LU and reg. Now, B sends (k, tpk, LU ) to A,
and then runs sub-routine A as follows.
• Corrupt TTP Oracle: If A queries the corrupt TTP oracle,
B sends the private issuer key tik, the private opening key
tok and the registration table reg to A.
• Corrupt User Oracle: If A queries the corrupt user oracle
by sending an index i,where Ui ∈ LU , B will retrieve
regi from reg and obtain (gsk[i], usk[i]) from challenger
C by asking U SK(i) oracle. Then, B sends the private
key uski and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui to A,
where uski = usk[i], regi = regi , and ski = gsk[i]. The
corrupted user list LCU , assumed initially empty, will be
updated by LCU = LCU ∪ {Ui }.
• Generate User Proof Oracle: If A queries the generate
user proof oracle by a message mi and a user ID
Ui , where Ui ∈ LU , B̧ redirects this query to oracle
Gsig(i, mi ) which is provided by C. After obtaining
σi ← GSig(gski , mi ), by setting upi = σi B sends
upi w.r.t (mi , Ui ) to A. The generated user proof list
LU G , assumed initially empty, is then updated by LU P
= LU P ∪ {mi , Ui , upi }.
Finally, A will output a message m∗ and a user proof
up∗ . If A can break the non-frameability of our generic
ASSO construction, with non-negligible probability (m∗ , up∗ )
should be valid and it will be traced to a user U ∗ , where
U ∗ ∈ LU \LCU ∧ (m∗ , U ∗ , ∗) ∈
/ LU P . So, B can trivially set
σ ∗ = up∗ and output its forgery (m∗ , σ ∗ ) to break the nonframeability of the dynamic group signature scheme GS used
in our ASSO. According the definition given in Section 3.2.4,
it is not difficult to see that attacker B breaks the the nonframeability of the underlying group signature GS with the
same non-negligible probability in polynomial time.
Hence, the ASSO scheme proposed above is non-frameable
if the dynamic group signature scheme GS used in our
construction is non-frameable.

VI. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
In this paper, we proposed the first formal model to capture
an anonymous single sign-on (ASSO). In this model, a user is
anonymous and the TTP’s trust level is reduced, compared
to existing SSO solutions. We also demonstrated how any
dynamic group signature scheme, which follows Bellare et
al.’s model, can be straightforwardly transformed to an ASSO.
We also proved the security of this generic transformation by
assuming the security of the underlying group signature. This
formally confirms the relationship between a cryptographic

primitive and a security application. Namely, group signatures
are a strong enough tool to implement ASSO and ASSO forms
a good potential application of group signatures.
As our future work, several issues can be investigated.
Firstly, new ASSO solutions could be constructed from primitives other than group signatures. Secondly, mutual authentication and/or key agreement could be introduced into ASSO
as existing solutions for SSO given in [21], [22]. Finally, how
to implement fine-grained access control can be considered.
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